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RECENT CASES
exercises great foresight and conducts himself with great caution. 13 When an
accident is the result of a miscalculation of a voluntary act it may be termed accidental.1 4 These rules have been applied by numerous courts in allowing recovery
for voluntary acts which result in injuries. 15 However there are also many courts
which restrict recovery and hold that something unexpected or unforeseen must
occur in the act which precedes and causes the injury. 16 Most courts are in accord
that if the injury or death is the natural result of the insured's voluntary act and
the only thing unforseen is the death or injury it does not occur by accidental
means.)7 One court has said it makes no difference if the insured did voluntarily
set in motion the first of a series of actions which resulted in the injury or death, he
can still recover.18
The tendency to construe an insurance policy against the insurer and to allow
recovery when the accident is of such a nature that the layman would consider it
an accident is apparently justified on the basis of public policy. For it would seem
inequitable to allow an insurance company to escape liability by the use of a
technical phrase the meaning of which has not even been determined with any
degree of unanimity by the courts.
ROBERT M. LITrLE

DAMAGES AND THE EMINENT DOMAIN STATUTE

In 1934, plaintiff acquired certain property adjoining defendant railroad's
switch-yard which has been in use and operation since prior to 1926. The yard
comprised two main line tracks, running north and south, and a series of ten
tracks adjacent to and west of the main line used as switch tracks. The westernmost of this system of tracks, called a scale track, was within 100 ft. of plaintiff's
house. Plaintiff contends that defendant spotted its engine upon the scale track
nearer his house than was necessary, and that as a result, quantities of smoke, soot
and cinders and noxious vapors were cast upon his property causing him special
damage. Held, that, a railroad company is not liable to an abutting landowner,
under the eminent domain statute, for damages to the property after claims for
the original location and construction have been settled or barried by the statute
of limiations; and further, the court below erred in holding that the defendant
had created an "unnecessary nuisance" or private nuisance rather than a public
nuisance. Thompson v. Kimball, 165 F. (2d) 677, (C. C. A. 8th 1948).
13. Rustin v. Standard Life and Accident Insurance Co., 58 Neb. 792, 79 N. W.
712 (1899).
14. Joseph A. Coy Co., Inc. v. Younger, 192 Okla. 348, 136 P. (2d) 890 (1943).
15. Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 141 Neb. 41, 2 N. W. (2d) 576 (1942);
Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 367, 180 Atl. 649 (1935);
Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P. (2d) 733 (1935).
16. Donohue v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 259 Ky. 611, 82 S. W. (2d) 780
(1935); Parker v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co., 178 La.
977, 152 So. 583 (1933); Losleben v. California State Life Insurance Co.,
133 Cal. App. 550, 24 P. (2d) 825 (1933).
17. Evans v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 26 Wash. (2d) 594, 174 P.
(2d) 961, (1946).
18. Lickleider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 184 Iowa 423, 166 N. W.
363, 3 A. L. R. 1295 (1918), modified, 168 N. W. 884.
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The Constitution of the State of Nebraska provides that "The property of
no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."l
At the present time, some 24 other states2 have similar provisions in their constitutions. Until 1870,3 the state constitutions provided compensation only in the
instance of property taken, and in the event lands adjacent to the public work
were damaged, the property owner was left without remedy, 4 unless the injury
was actionable as a public nuisance.
The inclusion of the words "or damaged" in the eminent domain provisions
has lead to a divergence of opinion as to the extent of enlargment of the owners
rights. The disagreement is due principally to the interpretation of the word
"property". Hohfeld comments, "Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to which various legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; then again-and
with far greater discrimination and accuracy-the word is used to denote the
legal interest (or aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical
object." 5 The importance of the distinction in concepts is reflected when it is
considered that under the former there must be an interference with the possession
of the object, while in the latter it is sufficient if there is an interference with the
owner's legal relations which "constitute his property. "6
It is the admitted purpose of eminent domain proceedings "to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the making of
public improvements," in order to "put the injured party in as good condition as
he would have been in if the condemnation proceeding had not occurred."7 None1. Neb. Const., Art I, sec. 21; Wyoming's comparable provision, Wyo. Const.,
Art. I, see. 33.
2. Nichols, Eminent Domain, sec. 311, (2d. ed., 1917) for a list of the states
whose constitutions contain the words "or damaged," or their equivalent;
and 10 R. C. L. sec. 145, p. 165.
3. In 1870, the Illinois Constitutional article was framed, the first of its kind
including the words, "or damaged;" the purpose of the passage of the
article was expressed 'by W. H. Underwood in recognition of the fact that
there existed no remedy against a public corporation in performance of
its duties when there was no taking of property, "As I understand this
article, it will require compensation to be made for those damages which
necessarily and naturally rise to a party in consequence of these public
improvements." 2 Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of
Illinois 1577, (1870), art. 2, sec. 13.
4. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Illinois, ex rel Grimwood, 200 U. S. 561, 26 Sup.
Ct. 341, 50 L. Ed. 596 (1906); Bedford v. United States, 192 U. S. 217, 24
Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. Ed. 414 (1904); Slatten v. Des Moines Valley R. R.,
29 Iowa 148, 4 Am. Rep. 205 (1870).
5. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concepts, 23 Yale L. J. 16, 28 (1913).
6. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L. J. 221,
223 (1931). The conflict has centered in some courts around the principle:
that the clause provides a recovery only where one existed at common law
in absence of the statute authorizing the public work. Austin v. Augusta
Terminal Ry., 108 Ga. 671, 34 S. E. 853 (1899); Pennsylvania R. R. v.
Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 13 Atl. 690 (1888); Twentieth Century Corporation
v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 36 Utah 283, 103 Pac. 243 (1909); as compared
to those which contend: that a new right has been created where none before existed. Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882); Gottschalk v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 14 Neb. 550, 16 N. W. 475 (1883); City of Omaha
v. Kramer, 25 Neb. 489, 41 N. W. 295 (1889); Mason City and Ft. Dodge
R. R. v. Wolf, 148 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8th 1906).
7. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L. J. 221,
224 (1931).
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the-less, some courts will make recovery under the eminent domain provision contingent upon a showing of a direct physical injury to the corpus.8 The majority
view is expressed in the leading case, Rigney v. City of Chicago, indicating that
there must be "some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or private,
which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his property, and which gives to it
an additional value; and that by reason of such disturbance he has sustained a
special damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the
public generally." 9 While it may appear that the majority view adopted the
Hohfeld concept by the use of the words "disturbance of a right," employment of
the words "direct," and "physical," effect a conclusion quite opposed to it.1O This
has led courts to the conclusion that the injury must be to the corpus.11
The Nebraska rulel2 further qualifies the majority and moves toward the
Hohfeld principle by stating that there need be no "direct injury to the real estate
itself, but some physical disturbance of a right which the owner possesses in connection with his estate," 13 although the Nebraska rule conforms with the majority
view in requiring that the owner must sustain a special injury in respect to such
property in excess of tha tsustained by the public at large.14
Significant for the purpose of this paper, however, are the Nebraska decisions
in eminent domain cases, allowing plaintiff to recover after suffering damages
caused by smoke, soot, cinders, steam and noxious vapors cast upon his abutting
property by a railroad. "The plaintiff has sustained special damages by the construction and operation of the railroad near his premises in excess of that sustained
8. Smith v. St. Paul, M. and M. R. R., 39 Wash. 355, 81 Pac. 840, 842 (1905);
Farnandis v. Great Northern Ry., 41 Wash. 486, 84 Pac. 18 (1906); Pause
V. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S. E. 489, 491 (1896); Tidewater Ry. v.
Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 59 S. E. 407 (1907).
9. 102 Ill. 64, 80 (1882).
10. In commenting on the Rigney case, "It seems unfortunate that the court
should retain a physical requirement in the test for an obstruction or injury
to what it so carefully points out are intangibles." . . . such a test "indicates the difficulty in abandoning physical concepts in habits of thought."
Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 Yale L. J. 221,
245 (1931).
11. Pennsylvania R. R. v. Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 13 At. 690 (1888) ; Carroll v.
Wisconsin Central R. R., 40 Minn. 168, 41 N. W. 661 (1899); Rigney v. City
of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
12. It is conceded that the Nebraska decisions are liberal in allowing recovery
to abutting landowners for damage from smoke, soot, cinders, and noxious
vapors even when the facility is carrying out acts of a public nature. See
Matthias v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and S. S. M. Ry., 125 Minn. 224, 146
N. W. 353, 354 (1914); Austin v. Augusta Terminal Ry., 108 Ga. 671, 34
S. E. 852, 854 (1899).
13. The leading Nebraska case, Gottschalk v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 14 Neb.
550, 16 N. W. 475, 479 (1883).
14. This requirement exists, say the courts, for many reasons: (1) That the
law does not concern itself with trifles, see Bell v. Ohio and Pa. R. R., 25
Pa. 161, 175, 176 (1855). (2) That to allow recovery would cast too great
a burden on the public work, see Carroll v. Wisconsin Central R. R., 40
Minn. 168, 41 N. W. 661, 662 (1889).
(3) That the land owner must be
held to have anticipated the loss, see Louisville and Nashville Terminal Co.
v: Lellyett, 114 Tenn. 368, 85 S. W. 881, 889 (1905). (4) That to allow recovery would flood the courts with litigation, see St. Louis, S. F. and T.
Ry. v. Shaw, 99 Tex. 559, 92 5. W. 30, 31 (1906).
(5) That such inconvenience must be endured for the public good, see Pennsylvania R. R. v.
Marchant, 119 Pa. 541, 13 Atl. 690, 698 (1888).
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by the community at large. Smoke,'soot, and cinders are not thrown upon property
situated a few blocks from the road. . . . The fact that the property of a dozen
or more owners in the town is materially injured by the location of the defendant's
road does not affect the plaintiff's right to compensation for the depreciation in
value of his property." 15
An abundance of authority supports the view that a railroad company is not
liable to a landowner after damages for the original location and construction of
the railway have been settled or barred by the statute of limitations, and from this
6
rule it follows that a grantee of the original owner is likewise barred.1 Similarly,
one whose property is damaged but not taken could stand in no better position.17
The above rules would preclude plaintiff in the subject case from recovery
under the Eminent Domain statutes, but the true conflict arises when plaintiff
asserts his cause upon a nuisance theory contending that the structure itself produced no actual damage, but rather, the use and operation thereof is the sole cause,
and that since the use is the gist of the action, a cause of action arises when the
damage accrues.18 A majority of courts, -however, would find no difficulty in
resolving this problem through a "notion" called permanent nuisance which first
appeared in Troy v. Cheshire Railroad Company,19 which permitted the plaintiff
to recover prospective damages for injury even though the damage had not yet
occurred, announcing that, "Wherever the nuisance is of such a character that its
continuance is necessarily an injury, and where it is of a permanent charter, that
will continue without change from any cause but human labor, there the damage
is an original damage, and may be at once fully compensated . . . ."20 This theory
was at first confined to cases looking to the permanence of the structure,21 but it
was not long before the application was extended to instances where the nuisance
15. Omaha and North Platte R. R. v. Janeeek, 30 Neb. 276, 46 N. W. 478 (1890) ;
Chicago, K. and N. Ry. v. Hazels, 26 Neb. 364, 42 N. W. 93, 97 (1889);
Stehr v. Mason City and Fort Dodge Ry., 77 Neb. 641, 110 N. W. 701, 702
(1906).
16. " . . . where a railroad company, -having the power of eminent domain, has
entered into actual possession of land necessary for its corporate purposes
a subsequent vendee of the (owner) takes the land subject to the burden
...
of the railroad; and the right . . . to damages . . . belongs to the owner at
Roberts v. Northern
the time the railroad company took possession."
Pacific R. R., 158 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 756, 39 L. Ed. 873 (1895) ; See Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. Englehart, 57 Neb. 444, 77 N. W. 1092 (1899); for the
rule that although the grantor may assign the cause of action to his grantee,
action must be brought within the statutory period, see Peden v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 73 Iowa 328, 35 N. W. 424 (1887).
17. Chicago & E. I. Ry. v. Loeb, 118 Ill. 203, 8 N. E. 460 (1884); Milwaukee
N. R. R. v. Strange, 63 Wis. 178, 23 N. W. 432 (1885); Peden v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry., 73 Iowa 328, 35 N. W. 424 (1887).
18. Battishill v. Reed, 18 C. B. 696, 139 Eng. Rep. 1544 (C. P. 1856); Bonomi
v. Backhouse, El. B1. & El. 638, 120 Eng. Rep. 643 (K. B. 1858); for a
review of cases, see Uline v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E.
536 (1886), where the court allowed recovery in successive actions because
of the wrongful entry, but states a contrary doctrine where the entry is
rightful.
19. 23 N. H. 83, 55 Am. Dec. 177 (1851).
20. Id. at 102, 55 Am. Dec. at 187.
21. Peden v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 73 Iowa 328, 35 N. W. 424 (1887);
Gartner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 71 Neb. 444, 98 N. W. 1053 (1904), a
flooding case; Beronio v. Southern Pac. R. R., 86 Cal. 415, 24 Pac. 1093
(1890), construction of a switch line.
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resulted from operation of the utility22 and thus effecting the result that the
theory not only applied to "mere passive structures," but also to damages resulting from the operation of "factory, plant, railroad, or establishment."
The use of the concept has been twofold: In states where there is no constitutional provision in the eminent domain statutes such as avails in Nebraska, or
prior to their enactment, or even supposing that they are not under public charter,
it is used as a measure of damages, that is, a device used to obtain damages for
injuries not yet accrued. 2 3
Its second use is to determine when the statute of limitations starts to run,
which may make it incumbent upon the landowner to assert his remedy in the
form of parmanent nuisance, allowing but one recovery, and if he waits until his
property is in fact damaged, or if he attempts to recover in successive suits as the
damage accrues, he faces the prospect of being barred by the statute of limitations. 24 This construction, the courts indicate, is adopted because the original
cause of action anticipates that the damages sued for stem from a depreciation in
the value of the land caused by the construction and operation of the nuisance. 25
Though the instant case does not expressly nor impliedly admit adoption of
the permanent nuisance theory, this seemingly harsh decision may be amply justified by its application. And, while there is substantial authority to support the
theory, it has been suggested that plaintiff should be permitted to elect to consider
the damage as permanent, or to allow him to bring successive actions, thus relieving the heavy demand upon him to forsee the extent of injury to his property prior
6
to its occurrance. 2
The court in the subject case indicates by its holding that by a showing of
special damages, an action of private nuisance might have been properly maintained. It is anomalous that in actions under the Eminent Domain statute smoke,
soot, cinders and noxious vapors are special damages, 27 but under the nuisance
theory they are not a sufficient showing to sustain the action. It is submitted that
the court might have clarified Nebraska law and dispelled doubt as to the possi22. Chicago & E. I. R. R. v. Loeb, 118 Ill. 203, 8 N. E. 460 (1884) ; "The injury
in this case," says the court in Elisabethtown L. B. S. R. Co., v. Combs, 10
Bush 383, 393, 73 Kent. 383, 343 (1874), "if any is permanent and enduring
and there is no reason why a single recovery may not be had for the whole
injury." See Ill. Central R. R. v. Grabill, 50 Ill. 241 (1869) for a similar
statement; Jeffersonville M. & I. R. R. v. Esterle, 13 Bush 669, 76 Kent.
669 (1878).
23. Troy v. Cheshire R. R., supra, note 19, see Henry v. Ohio R. R., 40 W. Va.
234, 21 S. E. 863 (1895), where court distinguishes those nuisances called
permanent, and those where successive actions will lie.
24. Though it should be pointed out that a small minority of courts will allow
successive suits, Drake v. C. R. I. & P. R. R., 63 Iowa 302, 19 N. W. 215
(1884), an embankment case; Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753
(1923), an encroachment case. See Henry v. Ohio R. R., 40 W. Va. 234, 21
S. E. 863 (1895), as to when injury is permanent and when successive suits
may be allowed.
25. McCormick, Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
574 (1924).
26. Stehr v. Mason City and Fort Dodge Ry., 77 Neb. 641, 110 N. W. 701,
702 (1906).
27. Omaha and N. P. R. R. v. Janecek, 30 Neb. 276, 46 N. W. 478 (1890).
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bility of recovery by subsequent litigants by adoption of the permanent nuisance
theory and thereby obviated a necessity for a distinction between public and private
nuisance.
F. BuRDurr.

WYOMING STATE BAR SECTION
MINUTES OF THE LEGISLATIVE MEETING OF THE
WYOMING STATE BAR
Cheyenne, Wyoming
January 22, 1949
The Legislative Meeting of the Wyoming State Bar was held at the Supreme
Court Room in the Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming, on January
22, 1949, pursuant to the call of the President and due notice of the time and
place of the meeting having been sent to all members. The meeting was called
to order at 9:30 A. M. by President R. G. Diefenderfer who announced that the
meeting had been called to consider legislation.
The President then called upon Mr. Erle H. Reid, Chairman of the Legislative Committee. Various members of the Legislative Committee presented the
bills considered by the Committee with the recommendations thereon. The bills
presented, the recommendations of the Committee, and the action taken by the
meeting upon motion, made, seconded and carried in each case, are indicated
below.
1. Bill relating to minors committed to State Institutions. Committee recommendation: Approval. Action: approved and recommended
to Legislature for passage.
2. Bill relating to causes of action that survive. Committee recommendation: approval. Action: approved and recommended to Legislature for passage.
3. Bill relating to clauses in insurance policies as to insolvent
assureds. Committee recommendation: approval. Action: approved and
recommended to Legislature for passage.
4. Bill relating to orders to show cause in estates. Committee
recommendation: approval. Action: Disapproval. Bill referred back
to Sheridan County Bar Association.
5. Bill relating to fees for defending pauper prisoners. Committee
recommendation: approval. Action: amended with reference to appointment of counsel for minors prior to a plea of guilty and as amended,
approved and recommended to Legislature for passage.
6. Bill relating to residence in divorce cases where the grounds
are insanity. Committee recommendation: approval. Action: approved
and recommended to Legislature for passage.

